What happened
The destination name was accepted verbatim, allowing traversal/absolute paths; the fix confines destination to a vault basename, checks source resolution, and requires authentication on the /mcp router when legacy extensions are enabled (CWE-22 / CWE-306).
Why it matters
As an enterprise RAG/prompt-vault surface, an unconfined import path lets a caller read or overwrite files in a sovereign AI retrieval store, which can tamper with the indexed corpus an LLM retrieves from.
Attack vector
import_to_vault(source_path, destination_name) accepts caller-controlled paths but the content-pattern guard does not confine destination_name, so a caller can traverse out of the vault directory; the fix also requires source_path to resolve under DOCS_DIR/VAULT_IMPORT_ALLOWLIST and gates the /mcp router behind get_current_user.
Affected systems
Zyrabit-tech/zyrabit-SLM below 2.4.4 (api-rag import_to_vault)
Mitigation
Upgrade to zyrabit-SLM 2.4.4 or later.