What happened
FlowIntel's chatbot used one shared MCP session and a single process-wide environment variable to carry per-user API credentials to a child process. Because both are shared across concurrent requests, one user's authenticated identity can be applied to another user's tool invocation, and a stale/ambient credential can be inherited by a new request. CWE-200/CWE-290, CVSS 4.0 6.0.
Why it matters
In an AI investigation platform, the chatbot is the LLM-facing tool surface. Cross-user identity mixing lets a low-privilege user inherit a higher-privilege identity and read private case data, and leaves user-specific secrets mutated into the parent process environment as a persistent leak surface.
Attack vector
The chatbot uses a single shared MCP session and a process-wide FLOWINTEL_API_KEY environment variable to pass per-user credentials to a child process. A lower-privilege user can read data belonging to a higher-privilege user (private investigation cases), and an invalidated user (deleted/password changed/key revoked) can keep operating under a cached ambient credential.
Affected systems
FlowIntel < 4.1.0 (app/chatbot/chatbot_core.py)
Mitigation
Upgrade FlowIntel to 4.1.0 or later.