What happened
The heredoc delimiter was not made unique, so a lone EOF line closed the block and everything after it was interpreted by the shell. The attacker can modify the MCP server's file volume and reach any host on Obot's Docker network (including the Obot server and other MCP containers), though the init container is not privileged and has no Docker socket or host mounts.
Why it matters
In an agent platform, MCP server configuration is semi-privileged: a value the user controls ends up in a shell. This converts MCP server setup into command injection inside the agent runtime, letting a lower-privileged user pivot within the agent-host network.
Attack vector
Obot generates a shell script that writes file-type config values into a heredoc ending in the delimiter EOF and runs it in a short-lived init container. A value containing a line that is only EOF terminates the heredoc early and runs the remainder as shell commands, letting an authenticated user execute arbitrary commands in that init container.
Affected systems
obot-platform/obot 0.9.0 to 0.26.3 (Docker backend MCP server provisioning)
Mitigation
Upgrade to obot 0.27.0 or later, which copies files into the init container directly as an archive instead of passing them through a shell.