What happened
A prior advisory added egress checks to MCP connections and OAuth metadata discovery, but the token exchange and refresh requests used an unrestricted default HTTP client that followed redirects. The fix routes these through the egress-checked client and strips the MCP server's configured headers/backend-specific exceptions; a strict egress client is used when no client is configured.
Why it matters
Obot is an agent orchestration platform that brokers several MCP servers. SSRF from a Power-User-registered server lets an attacker probe the agent host's internal network and reach cloud instance metadata, which is a stepping stone to credential theft in the agent's hosting environment.
Attack vector
The OAuth token endpoint is taken from the remote MCP server's metadata without applying Obot's outbound network protections. A user who registers a remote MCP server can advertise a token endpoint on an internal/cloud-metadata address; if that service answers with an error status the response body is returned in the error, and redirects allow GET requests to internal hosts.
Affected systems
obot-platform/obot 0.8.0 to 0.26.3 (OAuth token exchange/refresh for remote MCP servers)
Mitigation
Upgrade to obot 0.27.0 or later, which routes all OAuth discovery/registration/token-exchange/refresh through Obot's egress-checked client (admin egress policy or tunnel) and blocks internal destinations by default.