What happened
No-auth deployments accepted requests without validating Host or Origin. The fix adds a host-guard middleware that rejects any Host that is not loopback (or an allowed private host) and rejects any present Origin not in the allowlist, closing DNS rebinding and the wildcard-CORS cross-origin read path while leaving non-browser MCP clients unaffected.
Why it matters
Obsidian vaults often hold research notes and local secrets surfaced to an agent. A browser-based attacker gaining the MCP tool surface can read and modify vault content the agent is trusted to access, without needing credentials — a pure cross-site exploit against a loopback agent tool.
Attack vector
With no MCP_AUTH_TOKEN the server installs no authenticate check and validates neither the Host nor the Origin header, so a malicious web page can use DNS rebinding (or a direct cross-origin fetch against wildcard CORS) to reach the /mcp tool surface and operate the agent's Obsidian vault.
Affected systems
es617/obsidian-sync-mcp before 0.5.7 (HTTP /mcp without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN)
Mitigation
Upgrade to obsidian-sync-mcp 0.5.7 or later, which installs a Host allowlist (localhost/127.0.0.1/::1, extend via MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS) and an Origin check in no-auth mode.