What happened
The pre-10.3.3 bridge dispatched /mcp without checking the Host header (exposing to DNS rebinding) or the Origin header (exposing to cross-site fetch, compounded by wildcard CORS) and without verifying a Todoist token. The fix introduces a trusted-host allowlist plus an Origin check and moves token validation into the request path.
Why it matters
This is a concrete instance of the MCP cross-site-control problem: a malicious website can covertly operate the AI agent's Todoist tool (read/modify tasks, exfiltrate data) from the victim's browser against a loopback-bound MCP server. Todoist is a widely-used SaaS, so the tool surface has real reach.
Attack vector
The HTTP MCP server accepts browser-origin requests to POST /mcp without validating Host or Origin headers or authenticating the browser caller, so a malicious page can use DNS rebinding or cross-site requests to invoke agent tools and read/modify the linked Todoist account.
Affected systems
todoist/todoist-mcp before 10.3.3 (optional todoist-mcp-http server)
Mitigation
Upgrade to todoist-mcp 10.3.3 or later, which adds a require-trusted-host middleware (allowlist default localhost/127.0.0.1/::1, extend via MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS) and require-valid-todoist-token validation on /mcp.