What happened
In sqlite-mcp (StacklokLabs) prior to 0.1.2, the default read-only mode can be bypassed through execute_query, which accepts a leading SELECT while the SQLite driver executes trailing statements, and through describe_table, which interpolates the caller-controlled table_name into SQL. This lets an LLM client invoke the tool in a supposedly read-only database session yet perform writes or other unintended statements.
Why it matters
An MCP server exposing a database to an LLM agent with a read-only contract is the security boundary that prevents the agent from mutating data. This bypass defeats that boundary, so a prompt-injected or over-privileged agent can write to the underlying SQLite database even when the operator configured read-only access.
Attack vector
An agent invoking execute_query with a leading SELECT (plus trailing statements) or describe_table with a crafted table_name executes unintended writes despite the configured read-only mode.
Affected systems
sqlite-mcp (StacklokLabs) before 0.1.2
Mitigation
Upgrade sqlite-mcp to 0.1.2 or later, which confines execution and validates the table name.