Vulnerability  ·  2026-11-18

A2A Java SDK (Vert.x transport) forwards Authorization and custom credential headers to a cross-authority redirect target (CVE-2026-130627)

VulnerabilityHigh impactGlobalCVE-2026-130627
In a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx (>=1.3.2.Final, <=1.4.0.Final), the hand-rolled POST redirect follower re-issues a redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and no credential stripping or same-authority check when PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) is opted into. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent returning a 30x cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) plus allowlisted API-key headers (X-API-Key, API-Key, X-Auth-Token, X-Authentication) to the attacker-controlled host (CWE-522). Fixed in 1.5.0.Final; the JDK/OkHttp transports already strip Authorization on cross-authority redirects.
A2A (Agent-to-Agent) is the emerging standard protocol for agent interoperability. This defect is in the agent client that carries the operator's credentials when calling other agents. The blast radius is any A2A Java deployment that follows redirects to a third-party/hostile agent — it leaks the bearer/API-keys used to authenticate to the agent authority, breaking the protocol's own cross-transport credential-stripping invariant.
Victim A2A HTTP client follows a redirect (302/307) to an attacker-controlled agent authority while followRedirects(true) is enabled; the Vert.x transport copies all headers, including Authorization and API-key headers, to the cross-origin target
a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx (A2A Java SDK) >=1.3.2.Final <=1.4.0.Final
Upgrade to 1.5.0.Final+; or keep PostBuilder.followRedirects(false) (default) so cross-authority POST redirects are not re-issued
GitHub Advisory GHSA-w377-w7c6-c8hrNVD CVE record
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