What happened
n8n-mcp is an MCP server that lets AI assistants operate n8n. Prior to 2.56.1, in HTTP mode with multi-tenancy enabled, workflow version-history backups were not isolated per tenant (CWE-639/CWE-862). An authenticated tenant could read workflow snapshots belonging to other tenants and delete or destroy other tenants' stored backups, including complete node definitions, credential references and authorization headers. CVSS 3.1 base score 9.9 (Critical), scope changed. Fixed in 2.56.1.
Why it matters
n8n is widely used for AI workflow automation, and n8n-mcp hands an AI assistant read/write access to those workflows and their credentials. Cross-tenant leakage of stored authorization headers and credential references lets one tenant harvest secrets used by other tenants' automation, potentially granting access to downstream systems the MCP server can reach.
Attack vector
An authenticated tenant sends crafted MCP requests in a multi-tenant HTTP deployment; because local workflow-version backups were not isolated per tenant, the tenant can read and delete other tenants' snapshots — including full node definitions, credential references and authorization headers.
Affected systems
n8n-mcp < 2.56.1 (HTTP mode, ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true)
Mitigation
Upgrade n8n-mcp to 2.56.1 or newer (GitHub GHSA-j6r7-6fhx-77wx). Disable ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT if multi-tenancy is not required.