What happened
Seed-verified: two authorization/information-disclosure issues in Trigger.dev's Dashboard Agent chat-session components published Oct 21, both fixed in the 4.6.x line per GHSA-pc95-gc74-wg87 and GHSA-wpp9-mq73-fhqm.
Why it matters
Conversation-history forgery in an agent dashboard undermines audit integrity of agent interactions, and leaked delegated actor tokens could be reused to impersonate the user in downstream tool calls.
Attack vector
Public session token holders call the PUT snapshot-url session endpoint to obtain presigned S3 write URLs for their own session and overwrite the agent's conversation history; the Dashboard Agent input proxy stores a delegated user-actor token in browser-readable session input records readable via the in-records endpoint.
Affected systems
Trigger.dev 4.5.0–<4.6.2 (CVE-2026-114067); 4.5.0–<4.6.0 (CVE-2026-114070)
Mitigation
Upgrade Trigger.dev to 4.6.2 (4.6.0 for the token disclosure); rotate any delegated tokens that may have been exposed in public-chat deployments.