What happened
Network-AI's MCP SSE transport validates origin incorrectly, reflecting localhost Origins into the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header even when the server listens on a non-loopback interface, allowing cross-origin reads of unauthenticated endpoints by pages spoofing a localhost Origin.
Why it matters
Minor but persistent CORS hygiene issue on an agent/MCP server: when operators bind beyond loopback, a stray malicious page can exfiltrate whatever the unauthenticated endpoints expose, undermining the localhost trust assumption baked into the design.
Attack vector
The SSE server reflects localhost Origins into Access-Control-Allow-Origin regardless of the bound interface. When the server binds a non-loopback address, an attacker's page with a localhost Origin visited by a victim can read unauthenticated endpoints such as /health cross-origin.
Affected systems
Network-AI (Jovancoding) < 5.15.2 (McpSseServer._handleRequest CORS)
Mitigation
Upgrade to Network-AI 5.15.2 (GHSA-4pvg-m42h-c3x2).