9Router AI router/gateway: client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header trusted → unauthenticated use of owner's LLM providers and credit/cost abuse (CVE-2026-56681 & CVE-2026-56682)

NVD published CVE-2026-56681 (CVSS 7.3, 9/22) and CVE-2026-56682 (CVSS 5.3): the 9Router AI gateway trusts the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip header for local-request classification when requests reach Next.js without the sanitizing wrapper, letting unauthenticated callers bypass the public-LLM-api key check and abuse the owner's paid model providers; the same header also roots the login rate limiter's bucket key.

AI gateway/routing deployments concentrate the operator's paid LLM credentials; a header-spoofing auth bypass lets outsiders consume expensive model credits at the owner's expense and enumerate providers/utils, the economical and asset-reachability impact unique to AI-gateway software.

Attacker sends direct requests to Next.js with a forged X-9r-Real-Ip header (e.g. 127.0.0.1); src/dashboardGuard.js isLocalRequest() and src/lib/auth/loginLimiter.js treat the caller as local, bypassing the API-key check intended to gate public LLM API access.

9Router < 0.5.6

Upgrade to 9Router 0.5.6 (commit efd20be8) which stops trusting the client header; ensure all traffic passes through the sanitizing custom-server.js wrapper that strips the header at the edge.